Security context
What an agent needs to avoid regressing past fixes and find the next vuln in this repo.
walletconnect/walletconnect-monorepo
v2.0 @ 2d064b8
40
Fixes
0
CVEs
HIGH
Peak severity
74.3%
Coverage
Highlights
Auth Bypass: 24 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
packages/sign-client/src/controllers/engine.ts: most-fixed (14 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
26 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Auth Bypass: Asynchronous signature verification loops and unawaited validation checks (such as isValidUpdate and isValidExtend) previously allowed invalid or unauthenticated session updates and extensions to proceed. This represents a critical risk of unauthorized state modification.
Auth Bypass: JWT attestation flows could be bypassed if the signature validation results of the P256 keys were not strictly checked, or if the decoded payload identifier was not checked against the encrypted request identifier. This allowed potential replay and spoofing of verification contexts.
Server-Side Request Forgery: The verification server URL used to initialize verification iframes was previously vulnerable to manipulation, allowing connections to untrusted servers. The system now enforces a host allowlist and hardcoded defaults during initialization.