Highlights
Race Condition: 1 prior fix. Scrutinize any change in this area.
rsa/pkcs1.py: most-fixed (2 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
2 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Timing Attack: Bleichenbacher-style timing oracles in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption allow remote attackers to decrypt arbitrary ciphertext. Any changes to decryption validation must execute in strictly constant time to avoid reintroducing this leak.
Signature Bypass: Incomplete length validation of signatures and ciphertexts allowed attackers to bypass checks or manipulate behavior by prepending zero bytes. Strict length verification against the expected key block size is required.
Race Condition: Concurrent access to shared blinding factor attributes can lead to mismatched blinding operations, exposing the private key to side-channel analysis. Thread safety must be enforced with mutex locks during calculation.