Highlights
Deserialization of Untrusted Data: 2 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
spring-jms: most-fixed (2 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
3 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Deserialization of Untrusted Data: Attackers can exploit incoming JMS messages to instantiate arbitrary, dangerous Java classes. This risk is highlighted by historical fixes restricting package resolution in both MappingJackson2MessageConverter and JacksonJsonMessageConverter.
Insecure Deserialization: The DefaultDeserializer lacks restricted class validation by default, which can lead to remote code execution when unmarshalling untrusted data streams if an ObjectInputFilter is not configured.
Expression Language Injection: Double-evaluation of Expression Language (EL) expressions in tags allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or obtain sensitive information, as seen in CVE-2011-2730.