Security context

What an agent needs to avoid regressing past fixes and find the next vuln in this repo.

orange-opensource/hurl

              master @ 878c59e
            

Fixes

CVEs

HIGH

Peak severity

42.9%

Coverage

Highlights

Information Disclosure: 6 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.

.github/workflows/accept-pull-request.yml: most-fixed (4 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.

5 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.

Recurring patterns

The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.

Information Disclosure: Insecure handling of HTTP redirects could lead to sensitive Authorization and Cookie headers being leaked across different origins, schemes, or ports. This presents a severe risk of session hijacking or credential theft during automated HTTP runs.

Path Traversal: Lack of canonicalization and prefix checks on user-supplied file reference parameters allowed arbitrary local file reads outside the configured context directory, exposing system configurations or sensitive credentials.

Code Injection: The workflow directly expanded untrusted GitHub comment contexts into shell steps, allowing pull request contributors to execute arbitrary shell code with repository permissions.