Highlights
Auth Bypass: 112 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
server/client.go: most-fixed (28 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
79 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Auth Bypass: Leafnode connections historically failed to validate or propagate subject-level publication and subscription permissions. This allowed unauthorized message flow, incorrect merging of local deny clauses, and unauthorized permission modifications on unsolicited leafnode connections.
Auth Bypass: Subject subscription validation logic allowed clients to bypass ACL restrictions through overlapping wildcard subjects, queue group join bypasses, or by overwriting previous deny decisions during queue-based permission evaluations.
Protocol Injection: Failure to validate MQTT topics and publish payloads allowed attackers to inject control characters (CRLF/carriage returns) directly into the NATS wire protocol stream, leading to command injection and protocol corruption.