Security context
What an agent needs to avoid regressing past fixes and find the next vuln in this repo.
mbed-tls/mbedtls
development @ 05e0dfb
5
Fixes
0
CVEs
HIGH
Peak severity
50.0%
Coverage
Highlights
Auth Bypass: 2 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
library/ssl_tls12_client.c: most-fixed (2 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
2 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Auth Bypass: Logic flaws in checking offered and supported signature-hash algorithm combinations allowed clients to accept unoffered, invalid, or disallowed signature schemes during the TLS 1.2 handshake. Developers must ensure strict separate validation helper checks are always invoked.
Auth Bypass: A state-machine bypass allowed fallback to legacy TLS 1.2 negotiation after the server had already issued a TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest, potentially leading to handshakes with unauthenticated parameters. State transitions must be strictly enforced.
Cryptographic Issues: Modifying session ticket extensions in-place during parsing prior to updating the handshake checksum corrupted the transcript hash. Cryptographic status and transcript checksum updates must occur before any destructive payload modifications.