Security context

What an agent needs to avoid regressing past fixes and find the next vuln in this repo.

marten-seemann/qtls-go1-18
master @ 40ed4cd
4
Fixes
0
CVEs
MEDIUM
Peak severity
Highlights
Auth Bypass: 2 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
handshake_server_tls13.go: most-fixed (2 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
0 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns

The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.

Auth Bypass: The server component historically permitted unauthorized 0-RTT early data execution during TLS 1.3 resumption handshakes when ALPN protocols or session state permissions did not strictly match the original session parameters. This allowed potential clients to bypass protocol restriction controls.
Replay Attack: Insufficient cache state cleanup during 0-RTT data attempts could allow session tickets to be reused, exposing the client handshake to replay vectors if the session ticket was not deleted prior to transmission.
Protocol Violation: Failure to enforce TLS 1.3 specification rules regarding HelloRetryRequests allowed invalid early data sequences to proceed when they should have been rejected by either side.