Highlights
Auth Bypass: 3 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
tls: most-fixed (2 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
0 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Auth Bypass: Misalignment between negotiated Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) parameters in active connections and resumed session states could allow attackers to bypass protocol restrictions or spoof application identities. Implementing robust serialization of the ALPN protocol into the TLS 1.3 session ticket is critical.
Replay Attack: When 0-RTT handshakes are initiated, failure to immediately invalidate or delete the local session ticket exposes the client to replay attacks. The client must ensure that once a ticket is used for early data, it cannot be reused in a duplicate handshake attempt.
Auth Bypass: The TLS 1.3 server handshake was previously vulnerable to an authentication bypass where early data was accepted even if the associated session ticket did not explicitly authorize 0-RTT. The server-side resumption code must strictly validate early data authorization.