Security context
What an agent needs to avoid regressing past fixes and find the next vuln in this repo.
devhubapp/devhub
master @ 1d0d66a
7
Fixes
1
CVEs
HIGH
Peak severity
66.7%
Coverage
Highlights
Information Disclosure: 4 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
packages/components/src/redux/sagas/auth.ts: most-fixed (2 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
2 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Information Disclosure: OAuth parameters and sensitive authentication tokens were left in URL query strings during login/logout flows, exposing credentials to browser history leakages. A similar telemetry-based leak existed via Bugsnag.setUser where sensitive email addresses were sent externally.
Open Redirect: Dynamic resolution of the OAuth callback URL via host headers (req.headers.host) permitted Host Header Injection and open redirects. Forcing a hardcoded callback domain was necessary to secure the flow.
Open Redirect: The mobile redirect URI validation in GitHub OAuth providers allowed arbitrary open redirects prior to the implementation of host canonicalization and prefix checks on the redirect_uri query parameter.