Highlights
Auth Bypass: 2 prior fixes. Scrutinize any change in this area.
validator/validator.go: most-fixed (4 issues). Treat as high-risk during review.
3 high-severity fixes in this history; regressions here are high-impact.
Recurring patterns
The bug types that recur here, drawn from past fixes, not open vulnerabilities.
Auth Bypass: Empty audience configurations or insecure signature algorithms (such as 'none') can allow unauthorized clients to bypass signature and claim validation entirely. Ensure a robust allowlist of algorithms and mandatory audience checks are enforced during instantiation.
Denial of Service: Parsing oversized tokens with excessive delimiters can lead to excessive memory allocation and CPU consumption, causing a denial of service. Strict format pre-validation on incoming raw tokens is required before passing them to the underlying parser.
Denial of Service: Nil-pointer dereferences during custom claims extraction can trigger runtime panics, crashing the middleware worker. Explicit nil checks are required prior to interface type assertions on claims containers.